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INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR

ON

Mind, Brain and Consciousness

| How to Prepare Abstract |

| Abstracts Accepted |


Topics for the Seminar


Topics for the Workshops



Honorary International Advisory Board

About The Seminar

Mind, Brain and Consciousness

Introduction

Purpose

Mind and Consciousness

The Brain

Workshops

The Goal, And Bridging the Gap


Programme and Speakers

Seminar Details

Registration Fees

Registration Form

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Pre-seminar lecture series

Abstracts Accepted


Myth of Consciousness 

Vivek Pachpande*


Consciousness is a widely debated issue in philosophy. There are innumerable theories which purport to explain consciousness, or which try to deny any such phenomenon called consciousness. My task here is to examine the concept called “consciousness” and try to come to grips with it. Firstly, I will try to show the ordinary usages of the term we call consciousness. I will propose that the term consciousness is elusive, it cannot be defined without circularity.

Secondly, I will examine the concept called Qualia, and give my reasons why I particularly would like to target it.

Thirdly, I will give summary of Dennett’s arguments by which he tries to prove that there is no such thing as Qualia.

Fourthly, I will try to show how far Dennett is successful in denying Qualia.

Lastly, I will conclude that there is no such phenomenon called consciousness apart from the body. To insist upon such a phenomenon is to invest in some myth. I will propose that the whole structure of consciousness, and the human sense of self-control and purposefulness, is a user illusion. We do not have conscious control over ourselves at all.

Keywords: Consciousness; Qualia; The knowledge argument

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*MA. Department of Philosophy, K. G. Joshi College of Arts and N. G. Bedekar College of Commerce Thane (W), Maharashtra, India 400601.

Email id: benthamspig@gmail.com

 

Final accepted 1st Workshop 31st Oct 2009 MBC