Abstracts Accepted
What Should be the Roles of Conscious States and Brain States in Theories of Mental Activity?
Donelson E. Dulany*
Abstract
When a title resonates controversy, I should say that I bring a particular perspective. For theoretical analyses of mental activity, I will sketch a mentalistic metatheory that I have presented in various ways, e.g. Dulany (1997, 2004, 2009). On enduring influences of behaviorism in psychology, assignment of roles to conscious and brain states has been influenced by fears of ontological non-materialism and “free will” in the sense of indeterminism, fears based on a confusion of theoretical with metaphysical assertions . Other current metatheories—computational and information processing—provide a “cognitive unconscious” and common endorsement of a monistic version of epiphenomenalism. On the mentalistic metatheory, however, conscious states are the sole carriers of symbolic representation of a past, present, or future in a world out there or in our own mental states and mental episodes. It also provides a more analytic approach to mental episodes and the non-conscious but non-symbolic. With competitive support of mentalistic theory, there can be support for the causal efficacy of conscious states that entails no metaphysical commitments. What consciousness explains, then, provides an explanation of consciousness—its adaptive value.
Can brain states have comparable positions in those theories? In principle, yes—on working assumptions that conscious states are coordinate in some way with brain states. (a) For specific states, then, what is the relative usefulness of phenomenal reports and brain imaging at its present technological development? Confidence in validity must call on the same logic from the philosophy of science. (b) Does reported evidence for unconscious mental states in perception, learning, and volitional control challenge a mentalistic metatheory? It is commonly interpreted as consistent with computational views of a “cognitive unconscious” and consciousness as epiphenomenal. Or does this illustrate conceptually driven methodological biases (Dulany, 2003)—and more interesting dissociations within consciousness, as in blindsight and prosopagnosia?
Keywords:
Mentalism; Consciousness; Symbols; Deliberative; Evocative; Neural networks; Phenomenal reports; Brain imaging
References
Dulany D.E., (1997), Consciousness in the explicit (deliberative) and implicit (evocative). In J. Cohen and J. Schooler (Eds.), Scientific approaches to consciousness (pp. 179-212). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Dulany D.E., (2003), Strategies for putting consciousness in its place, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(1), p33-43.
Dulany D.E., (2004), Higher order representation in a mentalistic metatheory. In R.J. Gennaro (Ed.), Higher order thought theories of consciousness (pp. 315-338). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Dulany D.E., (2009), Psychology and the study of consciousness. In T. Bayne, A.Cleeremans, & P. Wilkens (Eds.) Oxford Companion to Consciousness, (pp. 540-544). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
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*Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, 603 East Daniel Street, Champaign, Il 61820, USA.
Email: ddulany@illinois.edu
Int Seminar MBC, Jan 2010. Accepted
